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Notes
Competitive Regulation of Mobile Software
Systems: Promoting Innovation Through
Reform of Antitrust and Patent Laws
Josh Baskin*
This Note analyzes the current antitrust regulatory framework for high tech, iteratively
evolving computer and software systems. This issue has significant implications for the
current economy as many modern technology companies base their entire business
model on such systems. This Note examines the problems concerning software patents
through an analysis of two well-known mobile phone operating systems: Apple’s iOS
and Google’s Android.
This Note also examines the current regulatory framework that prevents large
companies from taking anticompetitive actions to expand their power in fast-moving
high tech markets at the expense of smaller competitors—specifically tying, predatory
innovation, refusal to deal or license, sham litigation, and overbroad software patents.
This Note also proposes several changes to both antitrust and patent laws that will
make it more difficult for established market players to prevent new competitors from
entering high tech markets, thereby promoting greater openness and innovation. These
changes include modernizing sham litigation, reducing the number of patent
infringement actions by allowing reverse engineering of software patent and an
independent invention defense, and increased scrutiny of the business improvements
antitrust defense.
Each of these proposed changes targets the promotion of innovation by enabling the
entry of new players into established markets without the threat of expensive litigation
constantly undermining the compatibility and efficiency of the products that they
attempt to bring to market.

* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2013. B.A. University of
California, Berkeley, Economics, 2010. I extend my thanks to the editors of the Hastings Law Journal
for their suggestions, support, and editorial assistance. I would also like to thank Professor Dorit Reiss
for her suggestions and feedback throughout the editing process.
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Introduction
Innovation defines the high tech industry. To survive and thrive,
high tech companies must continually update and improve their products
or risk losing market share to their competitors. Technology companies
increasingly seek to ensure survival by making their products essential to
consumers’ technology ecosystems: Once a consumer finds a certain
technology irreplaceable, she is much more likely to purchase additional
electronics that are compatible with the irreplaceable product, generating
an ecosystem of connected devices. The companies that own the primary
devices in such systems control the entire system. These companies can
limit access to their own products—creating a closed system—or they can
allow anyone to create a device that fully interacts with other devices in
the system, creating an open system.
This Note explores the current regulatory framework for open and
closed networked systems. It recommends several reforms to curb
anticompetitive conduct and retain intellectual property protection, and
encourages continued innovation within an industry that depends on
iterative improvements of its products. In particular, this Note focuses on
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the promotion of generative systems that promise the greatest possibility
of innovation in the future. The goal of these recommendations is to allow
small start-up companies with limited legal resources—the standard form
of entry into high tech industry—to innovate without anticompetitive legal
threats from established players that can spend lavishly on legal resources.
Networked systems create an incredible regulatory challenge.
Inventors of such systems require incentive to create, but granting them
too much control over a system’s underlying ideas will stymie new
inventions that the system inspires. Hence, there is a tension between
strong intellectual property rights in invention and promotion of growth
through iterative improvement.
Classifying systems on an open-to-closed scale measures this
tension. Open systems allow broad compatibility between many different
devices. Closed systems, on the other hand, tend to limit access between
parts through specific rules or only allow preapproved components to
connect to the system in the first place. As further detailed in Part I, each
type of system exhibits its own benefits and drawbacks.
In an ideal world, regulators would seek open and stable systems,
which provide the greatest potential for innovation while maintaining
security, privacy, and stability. In the real world, there is a trade-off
between allowing openness (or maximum compatibility and customizability)
and providing security, stability, and protection for rights-holders, which in
its own right spurs more innovation.
This Note focuses on two directly competing open and closed
systems within the same market—mobile operating systems dominated
by Google’s Android and Apple’s iOS—as proxies for networked
systems in general. It examines each system’s current regulatory field and
proposes changes to antitrust and patent laws that will encourage open
and generative systems, which are likely to promote the most continued
innovation in the industry.
Part I examines the history of open and closed computer systems
from their inception and provides brief histories of both Android and iOS.
Part II describes the current regulatory structure in place for Android and
iOS in terms of software and cellular phone markets under antitrust,
intellectual property, and consumer protection regimes. Part III makes
four recommendations to improve the competitiveness and innovative
power of these markets: (1) Modernize the antitrust sham litigation claim;
(2) allow reverse engineering of patents; (3) provide an independent
invention defense to patent infringement; and (4) allow the use of intent
evidence to analyze business improvement defenses. All of these reforms
would incentivize innovation by removing legal barriers that allow
established firms to enforce monopolies against start-up operations.
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I. Systems Background: iOS and Android
The history and development of computer systems highlights the
struggle between open accessible systems and closed compatible ones. A
system is “a group of devices or artificial objects or an organization
forming a network esp[ecially] for distributing something or serving a
1
common purpose.” Systems combine components that may have little
value on their own but substantial value when combined with
complementary components. For example, a computer requires a
processor, memory, storage, and an interface to be useful. By themselves,
each of these components has little value: A computer processor has no
value if it has no access to data, but together these components form a
powerful machine capable of almost infinite uses.
In order for a system to function properly, all of its components
must work together. Systems that are more open allow interoperability
and portability between the different components. Closed systems have
strict requirements that allow only the use of a limited set of components.
Drawing a line between open and closed systems is an impossible task
because one measures the level of openness relative to all other systems.
Instead, the open-closed system classification runs along a scale from the
theoretical maximums of completely open to completely closed.
No system can be completely open; there must be some limits in
order to ensure that the individual parts work together. Likewise, no
system is completely closed. For example, every computer system needs
electricity to function, which means it must have a component that is
compatible with an electricity delivery system. Open systems are generally
compatible with a greater variety of components than closed systems. As
a result, open systems allow more modification via external devices than
closed ones.
Computer systems developed along two different business models:
2
one that was almost completely closed and another that was almost

1. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 1184 (1973).
2. IBM marketed the first computer mainframes, which they sold as almost completely closed
systems. See Kevin Maney, The Maverick and His Machine 100 (2003). Starting with a punch card
machine invented by Herman Hollerith, IBM primarily sold computer mainframes to the U.S.
government and many of the world’s largest companies by the 1960s. Jonathan Zittrain, The Future
of the Internet and How to Stop It 11–12 (2008). The company’s business model revolved around
leasing a complete system to each client. Id. The leases covered hardware, software, maintenance, and
training. Id. at 12. Each mainframe came installed with software tailored to the client. Id. Accordingly,
IBM gave each client a customized machine for its business that could not be improved or changed
without consulting IBM. Id. IBM designed these systems as completely closed. End users could not
modify their functionality or add additional devices; only IBM software and hardware could connect
to these systems. Id. IBM adopted this model in part because its technology was so new customers did
not have the expertise or even ability to functionally modify any mainframes they purchased. Id. The
IBM leasing model is the closest computers have ever come to a closed system.
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3

completely open. Modern computers have settled somewhere in the
4
middle.
This Note compares two mobile phone operating systems as proxies
for computer systems generally: Google’s Android and Apple’s iOS. They
5
are the two leading operating systems for cellular phones. Each is the
center of a competing ecosystem of cellular phones. As direct competitors,
both systems have the same core functionality but rely on completely
different business models. This makes them ideal for an analysis and
comparison of the regulatory framework for high tech networked systems.
Apple’s iOS is based on the same philosophy as the 1984 Macintosh
6
and the original IBM punch card machines from the 1890s. iOS is only
compatible with one set of hardware: the iPhone. When it was released in
7
2007, no one had ever seen a system like it. iOS is a mostly closed system:
8
It is only compatible with Apple hardware and can only connect to
9
computers through Apple-made software. Any semblance of openness
in iOS originates in its App Store, which allows third-parties to interface
between their products and iOS. Even so, Apple only allows users to
install applications through its carefully controlled iTunes service, and it

3. The first personal computers exhibited the characteristics of open systems. In their infancy,
companies like Intel and Texas Instruments sold individual components, like processors and memory
chips, that hobbyists combined together to create the first personal computers. See Paul E. Ceruzzi, A
History of Modern Computing 222–26 (I. Bernard Cohen & William Aspray eds., 2d ed. 2003);
Zittrain, supra note 2, at 13. These systems were completely open—the hobbyist purchased each individual
component separately and assembled the machine herself. For example, some of the earliest systems could
use standard televisions as displays and cassette players to store data. Id. The user could install the software
of her choice on her system. Id. In the early years, personal computers were mostly a hobbyist’s activity that
required interchangeability between parts. Consequently, open design choices reigned.
4. As computer systems became more accessible, their design gravitated toward the center of the
spectrum, although not completely by choice. Entrepreneurs like Steve Jobs understood that massproducing a standardized personal computer complete with all necessary components meant a more
reliable, efficient, and cheaper computer for consumers. Ceruzzi, supra note 3, at 264. The company
he co-founded, Apple, Inc., released the forerunner to modern computer systems, the Macintosh, in
1984. Id. at 273. Unlike previous personal computers, the Macintosh was closed, meaning users could
not add additional hardware or modify the physical system itself. Id. at 275. Additionally, because
Apple wanted to retain control over the entire system, and for technical reasons, users were required
to use Apple’s own operating system. Id. at 276. Despite this restriction, users could install whatever
programs they wished on to their Apple computers without Apple’s permission. See Zittrain, supra
note 2, at 16. In fact, Apple encouraged users to write programs that could run on the operating
system, so the entire system remained relatively open. See id. at 11–18.
5. Zack Epstein, Android and iOS Regain Market Share in January as BlackBerry Slides, BGR,
(Feb. 1, 2012, 3:40 PM), http://www.bgr.com/2012/02/01/android-and-ios-regain-market-share-in-januaryas-blackberry-slides.
6. See supra note 2; Ceruzzi, supra note 3, at 275.
7. The original iOS offered no App Store and disallowed users from installing any of their own
software on the phone itself.
8. Compatible hardware includes the iPhone and, more recently, the iPod Touch and the iPad.
See Apple iOS, http://www.apple.com/ios (last visited July 30, 2013).
9. See Apple iTunes, http://www.apple.com/itunes (last visited July 30, 2013).
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carefully vets applications before they reach the market. Furthermore,
Apple restricts programmers from accessing the full power of the
11
iPhone’s hardware itself.
The development of Google’s Android system is analogous to the
12
personal computer revolution. Since the beginning, it has been an opensource system: Any phone manufacturer can make a phone that runs on
Android. Google does not restrict applications from running on its
13
14
system. Furthermore, development is not artificially restricted as on
Apple’s platform; software on the Android system can access the same
interfaces available to its manufacturers.
Both iOS and Android contain the same core functionality. They are
direct substitutes in an economic sense and face similar regulatory
problems from a competition and innovation perspective. However, one
developed as a closed system and the other as an open one. A review of
the existing regulatory body of law applicable to both systems underscores
the significance of this distinction.
II. Overview of the Existing Regulation of Android and iOS
Existing regulation of Android and iOS falls into two categories:
antitrust and intellectual property. Antitrust regulation seeks to ensure a
competitive marketplace and to prevent anticompetitive monopolization
of a market. Intellectual property—in this case patents—rewards inventors
by granting them a limited monopoly over the use of their inventions for a
limited period of time.
A. Antitrust
Congress designed American antitrust law to protect competition
and consumers. Antitrust law encompasses two main areas: combinations
15
in restraint of trade (violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act) and

10. See Apple App Review, https://developer.apple.com/appstore/guidelines.html (last visited July
30, 2013).
11. See Apple iOS App Programming Guide, https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/
#documentation/iPhone/Conceptual/iPhoneOSProgrammingGuide/Introduction/Introduction.html (last
visited July 30, 2013).
12. See supra note 3.
13. Google does not subject applications to pre-screening before allowing them onto its online
marketplace, but reserves the right to remove them if they violate the terms of service. In any event,
the Android software itself allows users to install programs directly onto the phone, a feature that iOS
lacks. Google’s app distribution system “Google Play” is optional for developers. They can distribute
apps using their own sources. See Android Other Developer Servs., http://developer.android.com/
legal.html (last visited July 30, 2013). For an example of third-party app distribution systems, see
Simon Hill, Tired of Google Play? Check out these Alternative Android App Stores, Digital Trends
(Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/android-app-stores.
14. See supra note 2.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
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monopolization of trade (violations of section 2 of the Sherman Act).
Section 1 violations occur when two or more parties conspire to restrain
17
trade through an agreement. A company violates section 2 when it
possesses or attempts to possess monopoly power in the relevant market
and willfully maintains that power in an anticompetitive manner,
“distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
18
product, business acumen, or historic accident.” Monopolization
generally requires a showing that a company attempted, acquired, or
maintained market power in a relevant market defined by product and
19
geography through exclusionary conduct.
Courts have struggled defining both the relevant market and
exclusionary conduct. This Note does not discuss problems related to
relevant market definition because it focuses on regulation of a specific
market. Both iOS and Android possess large market shares and the
ability to affect both the price and market output for cell phones and
20
operating system software. In other words, each has monopoly power in
the market. As a result, any action taken by either company will have a
dramatic effect on those markets as a whole. The discussion below
focuses on these markets intricacies. However, monopoly power is
required to sustain claims of tying, predatory innovation, or refusal to
deal or license. These antitrust concerns will therefore only apply to
market-dominating products like iOS and Android, as opposed to all
networked systems.
The difficulty in applying antitrust principles to new technology lies
in defining exclusionary, or anticompetitive, conduct. Courts have long
been wary of applying the Sherman Act to markets in which they have
little experience because they have been reluctant to over-regulate the
21
economy. The primary types of exclusionary conduct involving technology
22
23
include tying, predatory innovation, refusal to deal or license in the

16. Id. § 2.
17. Id. § 1 (“Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade . . . .”). This Note concerns unilateral actions of competitor companies who do not
license to each other and who seem intent on competition with each other so it will not focus on
section 1 violations. See Erica Ogg, Steve Jobs Vowed to “Destroy” Android, GigaOM (Oct. 21, 2011,
6:56 AM), http://www.gigaom.com/2011/10/21/steve-jobs-vowed-to-destroy-android.
18. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
19. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
20. The Supreme Court has alternatively defined monopoly power as “the ability to raise prices
above those that would be charged in a competitive market,” NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984), or “the power to control prices or exclude competition.” United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). For a more thorough discussion of
the definition of monopoly power (a term used synonymously with market power) see Thomas G.
Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 Geo. L.J. 241 (1987).
21. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1979).
22. See Eastman Kodak Co., v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461–62 (1992).
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patent context, and sham intellectual property infringement actions.
This Note considers each type of conduct in the context of Android and
iOS and the economic activities of smaller companies that rely on these
systems as the bases for their innovation.
1.

Tying

“A tying arrangement is ‘an agreement by a party to sell one
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a
different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase
26
that product from any other supplier.’” A tying agreement is unlawful
where it substantially impacts interstate commerce, where the seller
offers two products exclusively as a unit, and where the seller has
27
“economic power” in the tying product. Tying arrangements are
anticompetitive because they permit the seller to exploit its “control over
the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product
that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to
28
purchase elsewhere on different terms.”
In a seminal tying case, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Services (“Kodak I”), the Supreme Court examined Kodak’s replacement
parts policy and articulated tying doctrine as applied to a technologically
29
innovative market. When Kodak began selling high-volume photocopiers,
it allowed independent services organizations (“ISOs”) to buy replacement
30
parts directly from the company or the original licensed manufacturer.
Kodak later amended its policy and only sold replacement parts to buyers
31
of Kodak equipment or end users to repair their own equipment. As a
result, many ISOs found themselves unable to obtain parts and Kodak
32
forced them out of the market for servicing Kodak machines. Image
Technical Services, Inc. alleged that Kodak’s amended parts policy violated
33
section 2 because it tied the market for services to the market for parts.
Kodak I had two significant holdings. First, a single brand of a
34
product or service can be a relevant market under the Sherman Act.
23. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d. Cir 1979); Foremost Pro
Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d.534, 544–45 (9th Cir. 1983).
24. See Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216–17 (9th Cir. 1997);
Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1186 (1st Cir. 1994).
25. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig, 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
26. Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 461 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6
(1958)).
27. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984).
28. Id. at 12.
29. Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 457.
30. Id. at 458.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 459.
34. Id. at 481–82.
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This is significant because it opens the door for suits against companies
that attempt to control industries that stem from a product they have
created. Second, the Court held that as a matter of law, a “valid business
justification” can excuse actions that would otherwise be inconsistent
35
with section 2 of the Sherman Act. Valid business justifications include,
among other things, technical improvements to products or services
including increased compatibility and security. More recently, courts have
been reluctant to dismiss justifications provided by manufacturers as
36
invalid business justifications for fear of stifling innovation.
It is theoretically possible to frame a tying case against either Android
or iOS. In the case of iOS as the tying product, the tied product could be
37
either the iPhone itself, or it could be the iTunes App Store, which serves
as the exclusive gateway for customers to obtain digital content on their
38
phones. Apple certainly has “economic power” in the tying product: It
is the sole producer of iOS, just as Kodak is the sole producer of its copy
machines. Sales of iPhones and iOS certainly affect a substantial amount
of interstate commerce. An analogous prima facie claim would replace
39
Android as the tying product and the Android Market as the tied product.
A theoretical tying claim regarding Android or iOS would not and
should not survive in court. Both Apple and Google have many valid
business justifications, as outlined in Kodak I. Most prominent among
these is the need for compatibility, security, and simplicity for consumers
to use their devices. Given the reluctance of courts to declare business
justifications invalid, these justifications can and should prevent plaintiffs
from suing cell phone operating system manufacturers for tying under
section 2.
The Court’s unwillingness to find a tying violation in light of a valid
business justification creates a large loophole for platform owners, such
as Apple and Google, to use against smaller entities looking to build
upon those systems. For example, Apple has prevented the installation of
certain applications on iOS that may compete with an application made

35. Id. at 483.
36. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
37. Apple considers the iPhone to be part of the iOS system and therefore part of the market. See
Apple iOS, http://www.apple.com/iphone/ios (last visited July 30, 2013). Two rationales undercut this
argument. First, Android, iOS’s strongest competitor, performs the same core functions but is
designed independently of the phone’s hardware. Second, iOS is installable on two different devices,
one of which is not a cellular phone.
38. See Jeffrey Jarosch, Novel “Neutrality” Claims Against Internet Platforms: A Reasonable
Framework for Initial Scrutiny, 59 Clev. St. L. Rev. 537, 584 (2011).
39. Note that the more open Android system is less likely to lead to illegal tying because it
promotes compatibility between itself and any other component, while the closed iOS system can
theoretically be tied to any outside system with which it interacts.
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by Apple. In essence, Apple could block any software that it feels
competes with one of the core features of iOS, essentially tying iOS and
what could be a proprietary feature together. A business justification is
easy in that scenario: Apple could claim that a version of the software is
more secure and prevents hardware failure at a better rate than its
competitor’s version. This is certainly a valid business justification under
the current framework. Conveniently, it also allows Apple to eliminate
competitors—especially small firms that rely on Apple’s iOS as a platform
41
to distribute their products—and potential innovators from the market.
On the other hand, open systems like Android promote compatibility
and interoperability between the maximum number of components. To
this end, Android does not restrict installation of specific applications
through the Play Store, its version of the App Store. Further, it allows
users to install applications from sources outside the Play Store. This
exemplifies the competitive benefits of open systems.
2.

Predatory Innovation

A predatory innovation claim alleges that that a monopolist changed
42
its product specifically to interfere with competitors. For example, a
plaintiff could allege that a defendant company changed compatibility
specifications for its product solely to disqualify a competitor’s product
43
from connecting to it. This type of claim is incredibly difficult to prove.
Such a claim under section 2 infers that a “monopolist, no less than any
other competitor, is permitted and indeed encouraged to compete
aggressively on the merits, and any success it may achieve solely through
‘the process of invention and innovation’ is necessarily tolerated by the
44
antitrust laws.” Courts have rightly been concerned with predatory
innovation claims for two reasons. First, allowing courts to oversee product
design “would be contrary to the very purpose of the antitrust laws, which
45
is, after all, to foster and ensure competition on the merits.” Second,

40. In 2009, for example, Apple blocked a Google Voice application from installation on iOS
because it “duplicates features that come with the iPhone.” Erica Ogg, Apple Blocks Google Voice
App for iPhone, CNET (July 28, 2009, 1:25 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-10297618-37.html.
41. Google can theoretically take similar anticompetitive actions but, due to its commitment to
Android as an open system and lack of restriction on the source of applications (consumers can install
applications on Android without interfacing with Google’s online application repository), it will be
much less successful if it tries to do so.
42. Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir.
2010).
43. See id. at 998–99 (explaining that a design change by itself does not violate section 2 even if it
is performed by a monopolist and harms competitors as a result); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“As a general rule, courts are properly very skeptical about claims that
competition has been harmed by a dominant firm’s product design changes.”).
44. Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 544–45 (9th Cir. 1983)
(quoting Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir.1979)).
45. Id. at 544.
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any attempt by the courts to weigh the benefits of design improvements
46
and their anticompetitive effects would not be administrable.
Predatory innovation claims have been successful even though they
face an uphill battle. In United States v. Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit held
that Microsoft harmed competition by integrating Internet Explorer into
the Windows 98 Operating System without showing “that its conduct
47
serve[d] a purpose other than protecting its operating system monopoly.”
In Microsoft, the court found that although Microsoft made a general
claim that its vision for “deeper levels of technical integration is highly
efficient and provides substantial benefits to customers and developers[,]”
48
it did not specify or substantiate those claims. The court found that
Microsoft failed to meet its burden to show that its conduct served a
49
purpose other than protecting its monopoly. Under Microsoft, any
design improvement justifies an unassailable defense to antitrust liability
under section 2. However, that improvement must be identified in
sufficient detail in order for a court to identify it as such.
It is possible to conceive of predatory innovation claims against
Android and iOS. In fact, Apple has defeated similar claims in the past.
In In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litigation, the plaintiff challenged
50
two design changes to Apple’s iPod software. These changes eliminated
compatibility between iPods and third-party software and changed the
encryption method which Apple used to transfer digital content to
51
iPods. These changes rendered the plaintiff’s products incompatible
52
with Apple iPods. Even with a public statement in evidence stating that
Apple knew that its changes might break compatibility with the plaintiff’s
53
products and Apple’s continued refusal to license its new changes to the
54
plaintiff, the court granted summary judgment in Apple’s favor on one
55
claim and reserved the other for further factual findings. The court
determined that this valid business justification was enough to evade
antitrust liability.
Notice the structure of the above predatory innovation claim: It
devolves from an action that takes an open system—the Apple iPod—
46. Allied Orthopedic, 592 F.3d at 1000 (“There are no criteria that courts can use to calculate the
‘right’ amount of innovation, which would maximize social gains and minimize competitive injury. A
seemingly minor technological improvement today can lead to much greater advances in the future.
The balancing test proposed by plaintiffs would therefore require courts to weigh as-yet-unknown
benefits against current competitive injuries.”).
47. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
48. Id. at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. Id. at 67.
50. 796 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1143 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
51. Id. at 1143, 1146.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1144.
54. Id. at 1145.
55. Id. at 1148.
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56

and closes it. By definition, this change eliminates compatibility among
formerly compatible components. This could lead automatically to a
predatory innovation claim if there were no pro-competitive justification
for the actions limiting the compatibility with different devices. Because
57
procompetitive justifications are easy to come by, it is simple for a
technology company to improve its products that cut off compatibility
with all competitive or reliant products. These changes help established
software companies control markets that they have created but
completely stifle innovation from startup competitors, essentially
foreclosing competition and perhaps stagnating innovation in the market.
Open systems are much less likely to face predatory innovation claims
because they rarely limit compatibility with other components. For
example, Android would not likely face a claim like the one against Apple
because as an open system, it does not limit compatibility to certain types
of software or hardware other than those that meet minimum industry
standard specifications. Similarly, open systems are much less likely to
change their parameters to foreclose competition without a significant
reason for the change because open systems thrive on the potential for
independent developers to add compatible innovative components.
Inventors of widely used technology systems are most likely to use
predatory innovation to capture as much of the market they created as
possible. In the examples above, Microsoft and Apple sought to foreclose
competitors from providing a service directly related to a system that
they created. Proprietors of closed systems are by definition much more
likely to engage in such activity, because such systems restrict
interoperability and compatibility more than open ones.
3.

Refusal to Deal or License

Under the Sherman Act, a company “generally has a right to deal,
or refuse to deal, with whomever it likes, as long as it does so
58
independently.” But when a company has an established policy of
dealing with competitors and subsequently refuses to deal with them
59
without any efficiency justification, it can run afoul of competition laws.
Like predatory innovation, cessation of dealings without any efficiency
justification is anticompetitive because the refusing company likely hopes
that its cessation of dealings will hurt its competitor more than itself and
that it can capture any market share lost by its competitors.

56. The iPod was an open system because many different pieces of software could read and write to
it. By changing the iPod so that only iTunes could communicate with it, Apple closed the iPod system.
57. Examples of procompetitive justifications include security, ease of use, or protection of
copyrighted material.
58. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (citing United States v.
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
59. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 603–08 (1985).
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Intellectual property rights significantly complicate refusal to deal
claims in the realm of technology. When a company holds a patent on a
product, it has the right to exclude sales of that product to any other party
60
and to choose whether to license the patent at all. No “court has imposed
antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent or
61
copyright.” This protection under patent law is significant in any market
involving innovative technology because all competitors are likely to
62
maintain large patent portfolios to guard their rights. These protections
grant technology companies—like Google and Apple—significant leeway
to refuse to deal with anyone. Given that these exclusionary rights last
63
for twenty years, an eternity in technology markets, patent protection in
effect forecloses all competition or use of the patent subject matter for a
period long enough to ruin any startup effort to innovate in that field.
Courts have approached patent-related refusal to deal or license in
64
several different ways. In In re Independent Service Organizations
Antitrust Litigation (“Xerox”), the Federal Circuit emphasized the right to
exclude granted by the patent system, but it carved out “three limited
categories in which a patent holder would not be immune from antitrust
liability: (1) tying patented and unpatented products; (2) obtaining a
patent through knowing and willful fraud; and (3) engaging in sham
65
litigation.” Any action within the scope of a patent grant cannot violate
antitrust laws, and the court would not examine the subjective intent of the
66
refusal to deal with the competitor.
The Ninth Circuit applied antitrust law more expansively in Image
67
Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (“Kodak II”). Instead of
granting holders carte blanche to exclude or refuse to deal or license, the
court held that the use of a patent to exclude others is a presumptively

60. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 646–47 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting
Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964)) (“The patent laws which give a 17-year monopoly
on ‘making, using or selling the invention’ are in pari materia with the antitrust laws and modify them
pro tanto.”).
61. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216 (9th Cir. 1997). The
court also noted that it makes no difference whether a “case involves a selective refusal to sell
products protected by patents and copyrights, [and] not an absolute refusal to license.” Id. at 1216 n.9.
62. See, e.g., Evelyn M. Rusli & Claire Cain Miller, Google to Buy Motorola Mobility for $12.5
Billion, N.Y. Times (Aug. 15, 2011, 7:34 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/google-to-buymotorola-mobility (“Our acquisition of Motorola will increase competition by strengthening Google’s
patent portfolio, which will enable us to better protect Android from anticompetitive threats from
Microsoft, Apple and other companies . . . .”).
63. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
64. For a complete discussion of the courts approach to these types of cases, see Michael A.
Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761 (2002).
65. See Carrier, supra note 64, at 776–77 (citing In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d
1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
66. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
67. 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
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68

valid business justification. Upon remand from the Supreme Court, the
Ninth Circuit rejected Kodak’s argument that patents on the parts it now
refused to sell permitted them to refuse to deal without conflicting with
69
the Sherman Act. The court held that Kodak could not use patent
70
protections as a “pretext” to refuse to deal with or sell to competitors.
The Ninth Circuit went further to hold that evidence of the subjective
71
intent and state of mind of Kodak employees can show pretext. Given
that a manager at Kodak “testified that patents ‘did not cross [his] mind’
at the time Kodak began the parts policy,” the court found that Kodak
could not use patent grants as a post-hoc rationalization for amending its
72
policy to refuse to deal with ISOs.
The principle difference between the Ninth and Federal Circuit
approaches lies in the examination of subjective intent evidence. The
Federal Circuit refused to consider such evidence because the patent
73
holder in Xerox merely enforced its statutory rights. Without evidence
that the anticompetitive effect of the refusal to deal extended beyond the
74
statutory grant, the court would not consider evidence of intent.
The Ninth Circuit’s approach seems more equitable than the
Federal Circuit’s. While the goal of avoiding what may turn out to be a
complex task of establishing intent is admirable, it is fundamentally
75
unfair for a patent holder to hide behind the protections of that patent
as a post hoc rationalization. This is especially the case when a defendant
firm has licensed the patent for use to the complaining entity in the past,
only to withdraw licensing for an undisclosed reason, maintaining the
defense: “We didn’t want to license anymore and we have a patent.”
Declaring a defense purely under the scope of the patent smacks of
anticompetitive conduct and clearly extends beyond the public policy
supporting exclusive control of patented subject matter by a patent
76
holder.

68. Id. at 1218.
69. Id. at 1219.
70. Id. (“Neither the aims of intellectual property law, nor the antitrust laws justify allowing a
monopolist to rely upon a pretextual business justification to mask anticompetitive conduct.”). Pretext
can include acquisition of patents through fraud as in Xerox. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (alteration in original). But see In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322,
1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding that right to exclude granted by patent is not modified by intent,
therefore intent is irrelevant in patent-antitrust determination).
73. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs., 203 F.3d at 1327.
74. Id. at 1328.
75. On such protection afforded to a patent holder is a limited monopoly over the invention,
including the right of exclusion.
76. Two of the main policies underlying the right of exclusion to patent-holders are to encourage
new inventions by guaranteeing the subsequent right of control and to place inventions in the public
domain. When a firm has a patent over an invention and licenses that invention, it is taking advantage of
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Refusal to deal in the context of large platforms like operating
systems is problematic for innovation in the software industry. Small firms
rely on the widespread availability and market penetration of these
platforms when they release technology. Allowing platform owners to
refuse to deal for any valid business justification permits them to
cannibalize the business of smaller firms who have improved that platform
by releasing products within it. For example, it would be entirely possible
for Google to decide that it wants to modify Android to take on a degree
of functionality that is already available on a popular third-party
application. Google could refuse to allow users to install that application
on Android, which would completely and anti-competitively preempt the
firm that created the application. In this scenario, Google would have
complete immunity because it could rely on any number of valid business
justifications, such as increased security and stability of the platform itself.
This justification should not enable large platform developers to co-opt
market share from firms that justifiably rely on them to disseminate their
77
products.
It remains clear from the examples above that a company has no
duty to deal with any of its competitors absent previous dealings because
78
companies have the right to choose with whom they deal. Apple has
79
never explicitly licensed or sold iOS to anyone else and refuses to do so.
Therefore, Apple remains impervious to refusal to deal suits as it has
never dealt with competitors in the past. By extrapolation, closed systems
are less likely to deal with competitors because they lack interoperability
and compatibility with many outside devices. Therefore, they are less
likely to be liable for refusal to deal under current antitrust laws.
Google, on the other hand, has a blanket policy of licensing Android
80
to anyone. An open system like Android, run by a large corporation like
Google, frequently deals with competitors. If it were to revoke those
licensing agreements without a business justification, it could face antitrust
81
scrutiny. Google would preclude liability, however, if it had a genuine
its patent right of control. A subsequent refusal to deal on the grounds that it has the right to do so under
the patent is anticompetitive and partially removes the patented material from the public domain.
77. Recently, Apple committed a lighter version of this when it replaced Google Maps with its
own proprietary mapping software. However, Apple did not restrict Google from creating its own
separate mapping application. Even so, Apple Maps continues to act as the permanent default on iOS,
restricting some of the functionality once available to Google Maps.
78. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
79. Apple has offered to license patents underlying iOS but has not yet completed any public
deals. Nilay Patel, Apple Licensed iOS Scrolling Patent to Nokia and IBM, Offered License to
Samsung, The Verge (Dec. 3, 2011, 4:28 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2011/12/3/2608407/applelicense-ios-scrolling-patent-nokia-ibm-offered-samsung.
80. Licenses, Android Open Source Project, (last visited July 30, 2013) http://source.android.
com/source/licenses.html.
81. Google’s recent acquisition of Motorola Mobility Ltd., an actual manufacturer of cell phones, raised
these concerns among the Department of Justice and competitors. See Rusli & Miller, supra note 62.
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business reason for refusing to license. Overall, by their nature, open
systems are more likely to face antitrust liability for refusal to deal, but
they are only likely to do so if they exclude former partners from access to
the system, which would move them toward the closed end of the
spectrum.
As discussed above, inventors of both open and closed systems face
a litany of antitrust concerns. Closed systems are more likely to face
claims of illegal tying and predatory innovation. Open systems are more
likely to face refusal to deal claims, but only if they transition towards a
more closed environment.
4.

Antitrust Concerns Surrounding Intellectual Property
Infringement Actions and Sham Litigation

However, use of the court system through sham patent infringement
litigation or by misuse of a patent in a monopolization scheme can give
82
rise to antitrust liability. In Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment
Co., the Supreme Court found a valid antitrust cause of action where a
company “conspired to establish a monopoly in an unpatented appliance
83
beyond the scope of the patent and in violation of the anti-trust laws.”
The Court expanded this cause of action in Walker Process Equipment
Inc. v. Food Machinery, where it held that “the enforcement of a patent
procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of § 2 of the
84
Sherman Act.” A Walker Process claim requires showing that a patent
holder is attempting to enforce a fraudulently held patent in order to
85
monopolize a market. Lower courts have further fleshed out these
86
claims to allow antitrust claims based on illegitimate patent usage.
Fraud as perpetuated in Mercoid and Walker Process is a subset of
87
an exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity to petition the government
88
to take anticompetitive action against one’s competitors. The First
Amendment protects the ability of all persons to petition the
89
government. However, when a monopolist petitions the government to
take action that would provide an anticompetitive benefit in its favor,

82. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 664–65 (1944).
83. Id. at 662.
84. 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965).
85. Id. at 175.
86. See, e.g., Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952) (holding that pooling
of patents to maintain monopoly gives rise to antitrust action); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
601 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that enforcement of a knowingly invalid patent can give rise
to antitrust liability).
87. See generally E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135
(1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
88. See S.W. O’Donnell, Unified Theory of Antitrust Counterclaims in Patent Litigation, 9 Va. J.L.
& Tech. 8, 27 (2004).
89. U.S. Const. amend. 1.
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First Amendment freedoms collide with competition law. As one might
expect, First Amendment constitutional rights trump those delineated in
the Sherman Act: “[N]o violation of the [Sherman] Act can be predicated
90
upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws.”
Noerr-Pennington immunity has expanded to situations including redress
91
through judicial or quasi-judicial bodies.
The primary exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity is the sham
92
exception. In Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc., the Supreme Court articulated the modern
standard to determine whether a lawsuit constitutes sham litigation for
93
purposes of the Sherman Act. “First, the lawsuit must be objectively
baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect
94
success on the merits.” An objectively baseless suit is one in which the
plaintiffs have no probable cause to institute the suit in the first place,
similar to the probable cause standard used in the common law tort of
95
wrongful civil proceedings. If a plaintiff first shows that the underlying
suit was objectively baseless, she can then move to the second element of
the test: to show that the subjective purpose of the litigation is to invoke
government processes in a scheme to “interfere directly with the business
96
relationships of a competitor.” Noerr-Pennington immunity in the
context of sham litigation is incredibly difficult to overcome, because the
objective part of the test renders any lawsuit with a remote chance of
succeeding impervious to objection under the Sherman Act.
Whether a system is more open or closed does not bear on whether it
is susceptible to sham litigation antitrust violations. These violations go to
the character of the system’s designers. Even so, sham litigation represents
a serious threat against smaller firms looking to innovate in markets
related to iOS and Android. Small technology firms are usually composed
of few employees, very few of whom (if any) are lawyers. The presence of
a threat to their business in the form of an intimidating notice and pending
lawsuit directed at the firm is incredibly likely to stop development of any
product in its tracks. A small firm is unlikely to have the legal expertise to
evaluate the claim and to have the resources to hire legal counsel. In the
end, the firm is more likely to abandon the project in the face of intense
pressure than risk losing everything in court. The litigation may have been

90. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 135. For an extended discussion of the origins of Noerr-Pennington
immunity, see Sosa v. DirecTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 929–32 (9th Cir. 2006).
91. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510–12 (1972).
92. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
93. 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993).
94. Id. at 60.
95. Id. at 62.
96. Id. at 60–61 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144).
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a sham, but the firm will not contest it to find out, especially where the
burden for proving the sham is stacked against the small firm.
B. Patent
In addition to antitrust concerns, and of more importance to small
companies, developers of networked systems rely on patent protections
to incentivize investment in their products. Both Apple and Google use
patents to protect their inventions. The Constitution grants Congress the
power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
97
respective Writings and Discoveries.” Congress responded by passing
the Patent Act of 1790, establishing the patent system still in place in the
98
United States today. An inventor of “any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
99
improvement therefor” may patent that invention. This broad definition
of patentable subject matter makes almost anything patentable, including
pharmaceuticals, chemical processes, and more controversially, software
100
and business methods. Furthermore, patentable items must be useful,
101
novel, and nonobvious. For prospective patent holders, the novelty and
non-obvious requirements present the biggest hurdle.
Approved patents provide their inventors control over the patentable
102
subject matter. Patent holders can recover damages, attorney fees, and
even receive an injunction that prevents others from using the patented
103
subject matter. These are significant powers that allow inventors to
104
prevent others from copying their work. The Federal Circuit has
105
exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals on all patent cases. This Subpart
discusses the effects of enforcement of patent rights on open and closed
systems. Developers of closed systems can and do leverage the exclusive
use rights granted in the patent monopoly as a tool to prevent others from
accessing or competing with their systems.

97. U.S. Const. art. I § 8., cl. 8.
98. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2012).
99. Id. § 101.
100. See generally Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (2001); John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 Stan. L. Rev.
1247 (2011).
101. See 35 U.S.C §§ 101–03.
102. See id. § 271 (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during
the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”).
103. See id. §§ 283–85.
104. Most importantly, patent law contains no fair use or reverse-engineering exemptions. See
generally Cohen & Lemley, supra note 100.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012).
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The Particular Problem of Overbroad Software Patents

Software patents are a particular tool used by both Apple and Google
106
to protect iOS and Android. Apple and Google hold large patent
portfolios to prevent others from copying their inventions. For iOS and
Android, those patents protect the software. The patentability of software
107
has been controversial ever since approval of the first software patents.
In 1972, the Supreme Court rejected a patent for a software method
108
applicable to a general purpose computer of any type. However, the
Court soon changed its mind following the computer industry’s continued
growth. In 1981, the Court upheld a patent that included a mathematical
formula run by software in conjunction with significant “postsolution
109
activity” outside the computer program in Diamond v. Diehr. In other
words, software used in conjunction with already patentable subject matter
itself became patentable. This ruling spawned “the doctrine of magic
words” for which “software was patentable subject matter, but only if the
applicant recited the magic words and pretended that she was patenting
110
something else entirely.” The Supreme Court has assiduously refused to
111
discuss the patentability of software since Diehr. Later Federal Circuit
112
decisions have abrogated even the need for “magic words.” The modern
test for patentability is whether a process passes the “useful, concrete, and
113
tangible result” test.
The patentability of software presents several difficulties for the
modern patent system and innovation in software systems like iOS and
Android. First, a valid patent specification requires a description of the
innovation (“enablement”) and a description of the “best mode” of
114
implementing the innovation to allow practitioners to recreate it. These

106. Apple has patents protecting hardware related to iOS as well, but those patents are not as
problematic as purse software patents. See infra note 133.
107. For a more complete history of the patentability of software, see Cohen & Lemley, supra note 100,
at 8–11 and Andrew Nieh, Note, Software Wars: The Patent Menace, 55 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 295, 300–06
(2010).
108. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72–73 (1972) (holding that patenting of computer
algorithms alone is impermissible).
109. 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981).
110. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 100, at 9.
111. In Bilski v. Kappos, the Court rejected the machine-or-transformation test as the only test for
determining patent eligibility of a process. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). But the Court refused to
reconsider prior decisions by the Federal Circuit upholding software patents. Id. at 3248 n.40.
112. See generally State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp. Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
113. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
114. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint
inventor of carrying out the invention.”).
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requirements stem from one of the central components of patent policy:
namely, place inventions in the public domain once the patent has
115
expired. However, the Federal Circuit has severely curtailed both the
116
enablement and best mode requirements for successful software patents.
Disclosure of source code is not required, nor is any disclosure regarding
117
how to write the computer software. Such limited disclosure prevents
many of the invention’s useful elements from reaching the public domain.
Second, any iterative attempt to innovate by improving already
existing software likely infringes that software’s patents. For example, the
plain language of the Patent Act prohibits reverse engineering of
118
software. Every time a computer runs software or even decompiles
software—a process critical for reverse engineering—it makes a copy of
that software in the memory of the computer. This copy almost certainly
119
constitutes infringement. Patent holders can prevent any third-party or
competitor from duplicating any part of software that contains a patented
process because decompiling the software requires making a copy of the
patented part and constitutes direct patent infringement.
This restriction on reverse engineering stifles innovation in software
much more than other patentable inventions. The Patent Act does not
prohibit inventors from reverse engineering other patented inventions in
order to make improvements on them. In fact, inventors can file patents
120
covering improvements to already patented inventions. The structure of
software and the way it runs on computers artificially restricts this type of
iterative improvement. Furthermore, the typical software development
cycle exacerbates this prohibition.
More than many other types of invention, software relies on rapid
incremental improvements. Such iteration is not possible when developers
must reinvent the wheel because disclosure as to the best mode of
implementation of a software patent is lacking and they cannot reverse
engineer to discover it. Additionally, under the doctrine of equivalents, a
court may find infringement even if the accused process does not explicitly

115. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 100, at 24 n.86.
116. Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[W}here software
constitutes part of a best mode of carrying out an invention, description of such a best mode is satisfied
by a disclosure of the functions of the software.”).
117. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 100, at 24 n.87.
118. The defenses of first sale, implied license, experimental use, and patent misuse probably do
not apply to defend a patent infringement claim alleging reverse engineering of software. Id. at 29–36.
119. Id. at 19.
120. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”) (emphasis added).
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fall within the patent but is substantially equivalent to the patented
121
invention.
These patentability issues have presented significant impediments to
open systems. For example, Android relies on third parties to bring its
software to market on their cell phone hardware. Any group that controls
a process patent incorporated into Android can prevent a third party from
running Android on its system. This is because with Android installation
on a new phone, the third party is infringing on the software patent for a
particular process, even if 99% of the Android software itself does not
122
infringe any patents. This scenario has already come to light in the
form of patent licensing payments to Microsoft for each Android phone
123
sold. This problem is specific to open systems like Android because
they rely on compatibility with other devices, which may require use of
third-party processes to connect those devices.
Closed systems, on the other hand, do not rely as heavily on
interoperability of third-party devices and are therefore much less likely
to face this issue. iOS has not faced the same patent issues for several
other reasons, the most significant being that it has been first in the
market with many cell phone operating system innovations, and also
because Apple has been particularly zealous in patenting its inventions.
Both open and closed systems face a myriad of antitrust and patent
concerns. As discussed above, antitrust liability generally arises more
frequently for closed systems while open systems face greater difficulties
with patent infringement.

III. Proposed Regulations to Improve Innovation
The overview above outlines the current state of regulation of iOS
and Android. Both Apple and Google have broad leeway to use antitrust
laws and intellectual property rights to interfere with competitors and
each other under the guise of exclusivity. Several changes to competition
and intellectual property regulation could prevent these abuses.
The overriding theme of current regulation is that open systems
tend to commit fewer anticompetitive harms but are more likely to

121. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). See WarnerJenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
122. One may point out that this exact same scenario applies to every classic patentable process,
like the process to create a pharmaceutical. There are two differences in the case of software patents
from those processes. First, in this case, one patented process that comprises a miniscule proportion of
the entire software is preventing companies from licensing an otherwise completely legitimate product.
Second, the structure of the software injury, and particularly that of cell phone operating systems, does
not warrant the strong patent protections available in other industries. By default, innovation in the
software industry occurs at an iterative pace; use of a patent controlling a fairly limited process to
control the dissemination of an entire product creates more harm than good.
123. See Steve Lohr, Microsoft’s Patent Strategy Against Android, Bits Blog N.Y. Times (Oct. 3,
2011, 12:20 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/03/microsofts-patent-strategy-against-android.
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infringe on patented processes or violate the privacy of consumers. The
balance of new regulation depends on whether one prioritizes innovation
over property rights or vice-versa.
It is more important to promote generative systems than to uphold
laws protecting the intellectual property regimes in place, especially in the
software field. In other words, the law should promote open systems above
patent protection in high tech fields. Patent law promotes innovation by
incentivizing invention. Especially in the world of software, development
often involves iterative changes and user collaboration. It is important to
foster this type of growth in order to maintain the forward pace of
innovation in software. Furthermore, the promotion of open systems
prevents restriction of information and maintains technology as a vibrant
124
space for expression of new ideas. When systems are closed, society
suffers because people are less able to develop their own modes of
expression. Therefore, regulations of the industry in question should
promote open, generative systems.
Several changes to both antitrust and patent law will promote
generative systems. Chief among these is a change to the standard of proof
in sham litigation cases in order to prevent patent holders from interfering
with legitimate inventions similar to those covered by their patents.
A. Modernize the Sham Litigation Claim Through Use of
Subjective Intent Evidence
As discussed above, the use of the litigation process in an
anticompetitive manner can lead to severe penalties under the antitrust
laws. The standard for succeeding in one of these claims greatly favors
defendants. In order to successfully state an antitrust claim revolving
around sham litigation, a plaintiff must show that the underlying litigation
125
is both objectively and subjectively unreasonable. Establishing objective
unreasonableness requires showing that there is no probable cause to bring
suit, a standard which means that any suit which has even a modicum of
merit—even if strongly motivated by anticompetitive intent—will not
lead to antitrust liability. There have been several recent proposals to
expand the sham litigation exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity.
Congress has begun to recognize the need for reform of the
objective/subjective test. At a recent hearing before the Subcommittee on
Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the House of
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, several witnesses proposed
liberalizing the objective/subjective test due to the difficulty of establishing

124. See Jonathan Zittrain, Protecting the Internet Without Wrecking It, Boston Review, (Mar.
2008), http://bostonreview.net/forum/protecting-internet-without-wrecking-it.
125. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993).
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126

lack of probable cause. For example, evidence that executives of a
company knew that a patent was invalid is part of the second subjective
prong of the subjective/objective test. But under the current standard, a
prospective plaintiff cannot use this information until it objectively
proves that the litigation had no chance of success. This seems impossible
if the Patent Office approves the patent, given that such approval is
prima facie evidence of the patent’s validity. The ban on subjective
evidence that clearly shows culpability is irrational because it allows
those who admit to filing sham lawsuits to avoid liability.
Liberalizing the sham litigation standard to permit the use of
subjective evidence will significantly help promote open and generative
systems. It will become more difficult for holders of questionable software
127
patents to use the bully pulpit to prevent others from using their
discoveries, which are likely not in the public domain, to innovate. Under
a subjective standard, if it is obvious that a company is using its
intellectual property to foreclose competition without caring about
protecting its property, it becomes much easier for smaller companies to
defend themselves from sham suits because complete destruction of the
intellectual property claims is not required to win the suit. Additionally it
128
will significantly lower the effectiveness of patent trolls, who rely on
embellishing claims related to patents they received on assignment over
inventions that they had no hand in creating.
Allowing subjective evidence at the threshold of litigation has its
downsides. Any sort of subjective evidence places a greater burden on the
courts to sift through evidence, creating a larger likelihood that litigation
will cost more, take longer to complete, and lead to less conclusive results.
These are valid concerns. However, lengthier litigation that is defensible
on its merits is preferable to a system in which large firms can launch
blatant sham litigation against smaller ones with no fear of losing
because the litigation has a scintilla of probable cause.
Including subjective intent in this manner further promotes the goals
of open and generative systems by deterring patent trolls and others who
file sham litigation from proceeding with their claims in the first place. This
frees smaller companies from the prospect of full-scale defenses of their
products from tenuous-at-best infringement claims when such defenses
may be prohibitively expensive.
126. See, e.g., Litigation as a Predatory Practice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual
Property, Competition, and the Internet of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 112th Cong. 9–20 (2012)
(statement of J. Douglas Richards, Partner, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC).
127. Software patents are much more likely to be questionable because they tend to represent
smaller iterative improvements rather than breakthrough innovations, leading to obviousness
concerns. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve
It 156–58 (2009).
128. Patent trolls, also known as non-practicing entities, are patent-holders who acquire patents
without the intent to use or manufacture the patented invention.
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A more cogent criticism of the inclusion of subjective intent
evidence at the outset of sham litigation lies in the fact that including
subjective evidence at the outset of a case—before examining the
objective basis of a suit—may prohibit firms from exercising their explicit
rights under intellectual property laws to exclude others from using their
inventions. Intellectual property, particularly a patent, grants the holder
the complete right of exclusion to an invention for a period of time in
order to recoup the invention’s costs of research and development. The
entire purpose of any infringement suit is to prevent another party from
using a protected invention. This purpose in and of itself is anticompetitive,
and any examination into the subjective intent of the complainant will
show anticompetitive intent. All patent suits would then be sham litigation
under the antitrust laws. This label would prevent intellectual property
holders with monopoly power in certain industries from enforcing their
valid rights to exclude others.
This criticism misses a key ingredient of any sham litigation under
the antitrust laws. The counterclaiming party must still show that the
infringement claims will fail and that the primary purpose of the claims
was anticompetitive. Valid intellectual property claims are unaffected. In
Kodak II, the Ninth Circuit outlined this framework as it applied to a
129
refusal to deal. The Ninth Circuit framework prevents a pretextual
130
refusal to deal, even where valid patents support such a refusal. Use of
subjective intent would proceed similarly in a sham litigation claim. Valid
intellectual property rights would still be fully enforceable, and even failed
litigation would not be a sham without strong evidence of anticompetitive
131
Promotion of generative systems requires reform of the
intent.
objective/subjective test in order to prevent subjectively baseless patent
infringement suits. As detailed below, promoting innovation requires
several other patent reforms.
B. Reduce the Number of Patent Infringement Actions
The nature of the current software patent regime does not promote
open and generative systems. Three fixes to the way courts interpret
patent rights would promote significantly more innovation and
129. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1219–20 (9th Cir. 1997).
130. Id.
131. The need to be sure that the intent behind alleged sham litigation is anticompetitive is strong
enough to preserve First Amendment rights to petition the government for grievances in court. Any
claim of sham litigation would need to be supported by clear and convincing evidence of
anticompetitive intent, in addition to failed intellectual property claims in order to overcome the
presumption in favor of free use of the judicial system without facing liability for doing so. See E. R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961). But see Wolfe v. George,
486 F.3d 1120, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding statute prohibiting vexatious litigants from filing suit
because it was rationally related to a legitimate government interest, and false statements are not
immunized by the First Amendment right to petition).
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compatibility among software systems by reducing the number of patent
infringement actions: (1) Allow reverse engineering of software patents;
(2) permit an independent invention defense; and (3) import examination
of intent evidence in regard to business improvements that close systems
from access by competitors.
1.

Allow Reverse Engineering of Software Patents

Allowing reverse engineering of software would dramatically
increase innovation within the software industry for three reasons. First,
allowing reverse engineering would free competitors to examine each
other’s improvements in detail without fear of patent infringement and
improve upon them rather than imitate them. In fact, the iterative nature
of innovation in the software industry requires reverse engineering. The
inability to reverse engineer patented software forces developers to
reinvent the wheel on every new project. Currently, the courts interpret
the scope and latitude given to patents under the doctrine of equivalency
132
by examining the degree of non-obviousness of the invention. A more
pioneering invention is entitled to a broader range of equivalence than
133
others. In other words, more significant inventions receive more
protection under patent laws and a wider range of imitators are likely to
infringe. But the standard pattern of innovation in the software industry
involves considerable reuse of old code. Therefore, software is much less
likely to be pioneering in nature and is likely to run into significant
infringement issues under the doctrine of equivalency.
Allowing reverse engineering alleviates the problem of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalency. Under the current regime, programmers
must resolve old problems without reverse engineering and then, faced
with time pressures to release frequent software updates, add small
iterative improvements to their code. If inventors are able to reverse
engineer software, they will be able to focus on making significant
improvements without resolving old problems. Furthermore, allowing
reverse engineering will help return the content and best mode of
implementation of the patented software to the public domain, fulfilling
the public policy of disclosure which drives patent grants.
Second, allowing reverse engineering would promote the creation of
open, compatible, and generative systems because practitioners could to
understand each formerly patented system in enough detail to create
innovative compatible additions to formerly closed and walled-off
software. For example, allowing reverse engineering of Apple’s patented

132. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 100, at 40.
133. Id.
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iOS code would allow competitors to make software that runs more
134
efficiently and connects in new and unimagined ways with Apple devices.
Finally, permitting reverse engineering of patents will dramatically
reduce the number of patent infringement claims filed by competitor
corporations, freeing up resources for other more efficient activities.
Allowing reverse engineering has its downsides. The primary danger
is that competitor firms can discover how a patented product works and
then use the protected knowledge to copy and create an infringing
product. This argument draws little weight because in theory, there should
be no need to reverse engineer any patented product. Theoretically,
patenting an invention requires placing the know-how behind the
135
invention in the public domain. However, as discussed above, software
patents require almost no disclosure of the best practices or methods
behind the invention to the patent office. Concededly, it is unclear how
to accomplish such a disclosure short of adding hundreds of technical
pages to software patents. This makes an even stronger case that reverse
engineering may be the only way to place patented software in the public
domain. In fact, intellectual property law has long accepted reverse
engineering as a means to advance science and technology. The underlying
discoveries of intellectual property lie in the public domain and protections
are in place to prevent profit from direct infringement of protected
inventions. However, marketing an improved invention has never been
136
actionable under patent laws because it runs counter to their purpose.
Allowing reverse engineering directly improves software as much as it
improves innovation in every scientific field. Allowing reverse
engineering for software puts it on an even playing field.
Established firms also worry that allowing reverse engineering of
patented software will lead to higher levels of infringement because it
will be easier to replicate complex algorithms in competitive software.
Additionally, firms are concerned that the ability to reverse engineer
with impunity will lead to significant security breaches, as those who look
to invade secure software will have legal license to do so. These concerns
ignore key aspects of patent and other legal protections. Patent protection
is still valid after reverse engineering. The inventing party will still be able
to sue any imitator for infringement derived from the reverse engineering,
just not the act of reverse engineering itself. Second, removal of the
protection against reverse engineering will not exacerbate any potential
security issues because those who seek to breach software security systems

134. Apple would no doubt argue that this type of access severely degrades the stability and
security of the iOS environment. At the base level, there is a tradeoff amongst generativity,
compatibility, and security. Open systems that foster innovation need to be maintained in order to
drive the economy forward, and that security can be achieved with this in mind, not despite it.
135. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
136. See id. § 101 (declaring improvements to be patentable subject matter).
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are already breaching a whole host of other laws, including criminal
statutes with more serious penalties than those imposed in patent
infringement actions. Given these other laws, and the fact that they are
significantly easier to prosecute than patent infringement cases, the
prohibition on reverse engineering does not deter security breaches.
Finally, because the current limitation arises from the plain language
of the patent laws, allowing reverse engineering in software patents would
require a change to the statute, which might be difficult.
2.

Allow an Independent Invention Defense

Allowing independent inventors limited rights to use their inventions
will prevent abusive patent infringement actions. Many commentators
137
have proposed an independent invention defense to patent infringement.
Under this proposal, any inventor who unknowingly creates an already
138
patented invention prior to receiving actual or constructive notice of
the patent application will be immune from infringing on that patent.
Congress enacted a more limited version of this proposal as part of the
139
America Invents Act. The prior use defense under the current regime
requires that the claimant show prior commercial use of the invention at
140
least one year before the date of the filing of the patent. An independent
invention defense would remove these one year and commercial use
141
requirements.
An independent invention defense makes economic sense. Studies
have shown that a 10% price reduction to an invention charged by a patent
monopoly will reduce the patentee’s profits by 1% while decreasing the
142
social costs of the patent monopoly by 19%. This evidence suggests that
existing patent monopolies are suboptimal in favor of protection to the
patentee. Furthermore, the case for monopoly rights in the use and
control of intellectual property similar to those that exist in the use and
control of tangible property is weak because it is possible for two parties
to use intellectual property equally efficiently due to its non-competitive
137. See, e.g., Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement,
105 Mich. L. Rev. 475 (2006).
138. Publishing the details of the invention in a public repository or industry publication
constitutes notice if the re-inventor receives that publication before she re-invents the patented subject
matter. Publication of the details of the invention in recognized scientific journals or presented at
conferences also constitutes public notice. A blind posting of an invention where a re-inventor is not
likely to come across it does not constitute public notice. See id. at 486.
139. 35 U.S.C. § 273.
140. Id.
141. This defense is not especially relevant for the software industry due to the iterative process of
software development and the short lead time between invention of a new patentable software process
and its introduction to the market.
142. See Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing
Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 Mich. L.
Rev. 985, 989–90 (1999).
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nature. Tangible property does not enjoy the same advantage. Finally,
the independent inventor will not be able to sue others for patent
infringement or violation of other patent rights. Those rights remain
squarely with the first inventor to patent.
Such a defense would eliminate the spurious patent infringement
144
cases that have particular impact on the software industry. In particular,
patent trolls and other entities that do not manufacture or invent their own
technology plague the software industry. An independent invention
defense will prevent patent trolls from undertaking two specific practices
that warrant concern: First, patent trolls will no longer be able to file
continuations on patents that track the improvements in competitor’s
products because, by definition, competitors invented those products
145
without prior knowledge of the patented product. Patent trolls will be
much less pernicious in the software industry where companies develop
almost all improvements with short lead times, meaning that those
improvements are all most likely developed independently and without
knowledge of other patented material. Independent software developers
would not be subject to suit by patent trolls who hold patents but do not
influence development of improved software in any way.
Finally, an independent invention defense would allow software
developers to independently create inventions without fear of patent
infringement. Software development is not a difficult undertaking, but
research into the patent pool to determine whether a software design is
already prior art is nearly impossible for many of the small, independent
146
development studios that drive software innovation. Given this industry
structure, it is likely that most software inventions are independent of one
another. Because constructive notice requires publication in relevant
media or presentation to the software community, research into the
software patent pool will become simpler and more streamlined. All other
independently created software will be free from infringement actions.
There are two primary obstacles to an independent invention defense.
The first and most cogent is that first inventors will learn to issue notice
immediately, foreclosing the independent invention defense. This is not
necessarily objection to the defense; rather, it forces firms to publicize and
disclose their inventions to the public in order to obtain maximum
protection under the patent laws. This fulfills one of the primary policies
behind patent protection: disclosure of inventions into the public
domain. Critics are correct that increased notice will render the defense

143. Vermont, supra note 137, at 477.
144. See Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 Mich. L.
Rev. 1525, 1526 n.5 (2007).
145. See id. at 1526.
146. Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, at 13–14,(Mar. 6, 2012),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016968.
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moot, but the defense is not designed to allow all inventors who come in
second place in an invention race to claim protection, it is designed to
apply only to those who legitimately invent with no knowledge of the
prior art.
Second, opponents argue that firms will fake reinvention in order to
take advantage of the defense. This argument is unconvincing for two
reasons: (1) Fraud in the patent world is incredibly rare; and
(2) fraudulently reinventing a product has a much lesser reward than
fraudulently patenting it in the first place because the re-inventor does not
147
Furthermore, re-inventors will have a
receive exclusionary rights.
stringent evidentiary burden to show that they reinvented before receiving
notice. An independent inventor defense for software patents makes sense
because of the structure of the industry and the high social costs of
requiring programmers to reinvent the wheel every time they write a new
program. This defense, combined with allowing reverse engineering, will
considerably limit anticompetitive and meritless patent infringement
actions.
C. Increase Scrutiny of the “Business Improvements” Rationale
Through an Examination of Subjective Intent
Companies should not be able to mask anticompetitive changes to
their products through a post hoc business improvement rationale. It is
true that the law should give companies broad leeway to innovate without
opening themselves up to antitrust liability under a predatory innovation
scheme, but innovations masquerading as business improvements that
eliminate compatibility with other devices should be subject to some
antitrust scrutiny as opposed to none at all in order to promote more open
and generative systems. Currently, under Allied Orthopedic Alliances v.
Tyco Health Care Group, the courts find any test purporting to weigh the
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of product improvements both
148
burdensome on innovation and impossible to administer. However, this
standard allows a company to get away with any business improvement.
Those “improvements” clearly designed to destroy competitive
interoperability under the guise of a marginal improvement in a product
stoke the most concern. Such business improvements cause more
anticompetitive harm than actual benefit.
The solution to preventing pretextual business improvements lies in
an examination of intent. Just as with illegal tying involving patent
protection, the courts should look to the intent of the monopolist when
evaluating product improvements whose byproducts include significant

147. See Vermont, supra note 137, at 502.
148. 592 F.3d 991, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010).
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reductions in compatibility with competitive products and services. Of
course, the burden of proof regarding anticompetitive intent lies with the
complainant. A defendant will have the opportunity to assert a valid
business justification and the plaintiff will be able to rebut it with positive
evidence of the defendant’s anticompetitive intent.
These situations are somewhat analogous to tying. Business
improvements that reduce compatibility accomplish the same effects as
tying without explicitly forbidding the non-tied products. Where tying
requires a company to affirmatively link the tying and tied products
together, a business improvement that reduces compatibility in effect
forces linkage between the tying and tied product with the exact same
result. The only difference is the purported justification, which in many
cases could be licensed or modified to prevent the compatibility issues it
creates while still providing the sought after improvement. In reality,
predatory innovation involves purposeful modification of a product to
reduce compatibility with competitive products.
In In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litigation, Apple modified
iTunes to encrypt files in a different, more secure way and then
subsequently modified iTunes again to prevent any other product from
150
reading or writing to iPods. The court found that the first change was a
business improvement and refused to consider its anticompetitive effects,
even though those effects were significant because they prevented
151
compatibility between competitive products and the iPod. The Court
did not rule on the second change because there were genuine issues of
152
fact regarding whether it was actually a business improvement.
However, the second change itself eliminated all compatibility between
the iPod and competitive software. This severely anticompetitive action,
used to foreclose competition in the market, goes unchecked under the
current antitrust jurisprudence.
Intent is the key indicator in cases addressing business improvements.
Courts have found tests regarding innovation non-administrable for good
reason. It is nearly impossible to weigh the procompetitive effects of an
innovation with the anticompetitive effects on competitors. Therefore,
intent is a more effective gauge that allows courts to distill the
anticompetitive actions of the parties. Courts are skilled at distilling and
evaluating intent. Lawyers and judges have specific training to evaluate a
person’s credibility and to determine one’s inner thoughts from her
actions. In the most legislated branch of our legal system—criminal

149. See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1219 (9th Cir. 1997).
150. 796 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1143, 1146 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
151. Id. at 1144.
152. Id. at 1147. This was probably because Apple failed to preclude all genuine issues of material
fact on summary judgment, not because they did not show what would eventually be a valid business
justification.
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law—almost every major crime requires proof of knowing intent. Our
legal system has established methods by which to determine an actor’s
intent. There is no reason not to impute those skills into the antitrust
realm.
Some commentators have decried the use of intent in antitrust on the
153
grounds that intent proves too much. In theory, competitors always
intend to defeat each other, so an examination of the intent of competitors’
154
actions will always show anticompetitive intent. In practice, however,
this is simply not the case. There is a huge gap between intentional
anticompetitive actions to harm a competitor by eliminating compatibility
and actions that harm a competitor through the introduction of a superior
product. The latter is clearly a procompetitive action, the type that the
antitrust laws seek to protect. The former does not rely on superior skill,
industry, or foresight, but rather is a pure example of a company using
monopoly power to foreclose competition by cutting off access to the
market. An examination of intent can see through these anticompetitive
actions in a way that is fair, equitable, and administrable by the courts.

Conclusion
The backbone of innovation in the software industry comes from
the ability of users to grapple with, modify, and combine existing
products to create iterative improvements. Android and iOS provide
helpful examples of two differing tracks of software innovation. Both
provide stable platforms for software developers to innovate in the
mobile technology space. Continuing to promote innovation requires
that small parties with few legal resources be permitted to continue
innovation without facing anticompetitive threats from established
players in the market and infringement actions from holders of
questionable patents. This Note proposes amendments to the sham
litigation doctrine under Noerr-Pennington, modifications to the patent
regime allowing reverse engineering of software and an independent
invention defense, and a modification to the business improvements
justification under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Each of these changes to the regulatory scheme for networked
systems will increase openness and, by extension, innovation. They do so
by (1) limiting the use of the courts to block invention in the name of
patent rights held by trolls and other non-practicing entities, (2) reducing
meritless and burdensome patent infringement litigation, and
(3) disallowing pretextual conduct by established industry players to
anticompetitively reduce compatibility with their products.

153. See Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761, 794
(2002).
154. Id.
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